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JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK*

I am delighted to deliver this year's Henry Lecture. It is named in honor of
a distinguished judicial family, so I thought that I would tackle a judge's
subject - though one that ought to be at the forefront of every lawyer's
thought. It gives me an opportunity to work through a subject that has been
troubling me for years - and should concern anyone who thinks about the
process of interpreting legal texts. My question boils down to this: what is the
right level of generality at which afederaljudge should read a statute? This
way of putting the question is important: I hope to persuade you that the
identity of the interpreter affects the means of interpretation, and thus the
meaning, of a statute. Some years ago I took up levels of generality for
constitutional interpretation.' I'm reasonably satisfied with the result but have
had trouble extending the approach to statutes. You can judge for yourselves
whether this was trouble worth taking. But before tackling the argument indeed, before defining what I mean by levels of generality - I want to cover
some background.
Most statutes that produce litigation admit of multiple readings. I say this
in the sense that people rarely come to court with clear cases. Why spend
money butting your head against a wall? People come to court when texts are
ambiguous, or conflict, or are so old that a once-clear meaning has dimmed
because of changes in the language or legal culture.
© 2003 Frank H. Easterbrook
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, the Law
School, the University of Chicago. Many of the ideas here are abstracted from a book in
progress, tentatively entitled Legal Interpretation.Essays more or less related to this one were
presented at the law schools of Florida State University, George Mason University, the
University of Chicago, and Yale University; I appreciate the many comments received at or after
those presentations.
1. Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349 (1992).
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No simple approach to these problems is sensible, because words are not
born with meanings. Words take their effect from contexts, of which there are
many - other words, social conventions, the problems the authors were
addressing. Texts appeal to communities of listeners, and we use.them
purposively. Readers' purposes, and so the meaning, will change with
context, and over time.
Thus it is not surprising to find courts saying that, when an administrative
agency encounters one of these ambiguities, it may adopt any reasonable
construction of the law - and for this purpose "reasonable" constructions
include those generated politically, by who gains and loses, and by the
agency's view of good outcomes. An agency will announce that it chose a
particular outcome because it pleases interest groups and members of
Congress; a generally textualist Supreme Court will nod approvingly, even
though the statutory text fades in the process. Similarly the Court, without
blushing, will enforce one construction of the National Labor Relations Act
when adopted by President Reagan's Labor Board, and a 180-degree opposite
construction when adopted by President Clinton's Board. These days the
word Chevron2 sums up this approach.
Here is a recent example. Lopez v. Davis3 held that the Bureau of Prisons
could use a particular law to deny most drug offenders any sentence reduction
for completing drug-abuse programs, even though the statute says that the only
prisoners ineligible for the credit are those whose offenses were crimes of
violence. After Congress enacted this law, the Bureau issued a regulation
saying that people whose real conduct included guns are disqualified, even if
their convictions did not relate to firearms. Courts across the nation declared
this understanding invalid, as it plainly was. Convictions are a subset of all
wrongful conduct, and the statutory disqualification depends on conviction
only. Then the Bureau changed its regulation to say, in effect: "Oh, we'rejust
doing this as a matter of discretion." Several courts of appeals condemned
that maneuver, but the Supreme Court, citing Chevron, thought otherwise and
said: "Discretion! Well, that's different!" The Bureau thus prevailed.
Justices Scalia and Thomas, the most consistent textualists on the Court,
joined Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Lopez. Both on and off the bench,
Justice Scalia has proclaimed himself a fan of Chevron.4 It is hard to find
thoroughgoing critics of that case and the doctrine it summarizes.

2. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3. 531 U.S. 230 (2001).
4. E.g., Antonin Scalia, JudicialDeference to AdministrativeInterpretationsofLaw, 1989
DuKE L.J. 511 (1990). His view of Chevron differs, however, from that of his colleagues. See
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
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Although this attitude toward executive discretion is old - Chevron isjust
the latest iteration of an attitude that has long been employed, if not so clearly
articulated - it should seem odd as well. Especially for textualist judges,
who believe that meaning is encoded in texts that must be carried out rather
than tinkered with. Everything an agency is likely to rely on - political
pressure, the President's view of happy outcomes, cost-benefit studies,
legislative history (including letters or tongue-lashings from members of
Congress, as well as the committee reports), and the other tools of policy
wonks - is off limits to textualist judges. More than that. These days even
the judges most attracted to the Hart and Sacks legal process school, which
5
urged interpreters to find and extend the legislation's spirit, disclaim
entitlement to rely on personal, and perhaps idiosyncratic, views of wise
policy. Yet "good" outcomes are exactly what an agency sets out to achieve
when exercising discretion.
Let me put the problem more directly. Judges and scholars usually write
about Chevron and deference to agencies as if the question on the table were
who does the interpretation - a judge with tenure, an "expert" at an agency,
6
or a political official serving at the President's pleasure. I see the choice
differently. The principal subject is what methods of interpretationwill be
applied. Judges in their own work forswear the methods that agencies
employ - and that by invoking Chevron judges allow agencies to employ.
Ajudge who announces deference is approving a shift in interpretive method,
notjust a shift in the identity of the decider, as if a suit were being transferred
to a court in a different venue. What is more, the methods that agencies
employ are entirely sensible ones.
If statutes are ambiguous, if it is reasonableor even inevitable for agencies
to exercise discretion when interpreting laws, if there isjust no rightanswer,
then why can't judges do as agencies do? If the statute is addressed to an
agency, then the agency has discretion; if the statute is addressed to a judge,
then the judge has discretion. Recall that many themes of textualism - such
as disregard of legislative history because of the constitutional bicameralism
rule7 and the idea that consistent interpretation over time is part of what it
5. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1111-1380
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
6. 1 put "expert" in quotations because agency members are not chosen for scientific
prowess, rarely have skills in scholarly research or analysis, and almost never subject their
conclusions to dispassionate scholarly study. References to "expertise" in administrative law
are either rhetorical ploys or reflect ignorance about how commissions actually are chosen and
operate. See Bechtel v. FCC, 10 F.3d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Elliott v. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n, 202 F.3d 926, 940 (7th Cir. 2000) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting); Frank H.
Easterbrook, "Success" and the JudicialPower, 65 INDiANA L.J. 277 (1990).
7. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine,97 COLUM. L.
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means to say that statutes are law rather than simply exhortations - seem to
be as applicable to agencies as to judges. What is more, the foundation for
textualist interpretation - that judges must be faithful agents of legislative
decisions - seems no less applicable to agencies. Under Article II, the
President and his staff are supposed to faithfully execute the law, not
manipulate the law. So if discretionary interpretation is OK for officers under
Article II, why is it not OK for officers appointed under Article IIhI? If
textualism is required for Article III officers, why not for Article II officers?
And if the judge has discretion, why not a policy-oriented discretion? Does
it not seem inconsistent for judges to deny themselves a power that they grant
to the Bureau of Prisons? Indeed, don't the rationales for deferring to
administrative interpretations show that the foundation of textualism on the
bench is quicksand? If there is no right answer for statutes addressed to
agencies, there is no right answer for statutes addressed to judges, and we had
best face up to that fact.
Resolution of this apparent inconsistency requires both unpacking multiple
meanings of administrative discretion in interpretation and analyzing the
differences between Article II officers and Article IlI officers. Let me start
with the former, which the Justices themselves did in United States v. Mead
Corp.,9 to which I will allude without attempting to parse. (Mead, the most
important decision on the subject since Chevron, also stopped with the first
question; the Court did not see, or at least did not discuss, the link between the
identity of the decider and the appropriate interpretive norms. There are other
shortcomings in that opinion, but it is not my goal to attend to these.)1)
When judges speak of "deference" to an administrative decision, or
proclaim that agencies have discretion, they may mean any of three things:
0 Delegation. When Congress has given an agency the power to
adopt legal norms via formal rulemaking or administrative
adjudication, the court must accept action within the scope of
the delegated power the same way it accepts legislation. The
REV. 673 (1997).
8. I'm not the first to ask this question. See Michael Herz, Textualism and Taboo:
Interpretationand Deferencefor Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1663 (1991).

9. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
10. One particular problem is that, although Mead treats deference as coterminous with
delegation, it then equates the sphere of deference with decisions made in certain formal ways,
such as through rulemaking. Yet it is hard to see how the agency's choice of means to carry out
a delegated function demonstrates the extent of that delegation. The agency controls the means,
but Congress and President together determine how much authority to delegate. For some other
problems, see Adrian Vermeule, Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 355-61

(2003).
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agency is making rather than interpreting rules. What the statute
principally encodes is who decides, rather than how that actor
must decide. This, Mead insists, is the limit of Chevron.
* Respect. When the statute tells the executive branch to achieve
a goal - that is, when the law specifies ends, such as clean air,
rather than means such as the percentage of particulates to be
filtered out - the choices made in pursuit of that objective are
political in nature. The President rather than a judge decides
how to'execute the laws, and a court therefore must respect the
'discretionary choices of a coordinate branch of government.
, You can think of laws naming objectives rather than means as
a form of delegation to whoever chooses how to achieve the
objective.
* Persuasion. On a "pure" question of law, where nothing has
been delegated, an agency's views may persuade when they
cannot compel. To the extent statutory text and structure are
conclusive on the issue of meaning, an agency may persuade by
illuminating how the pieces of the statute fit together. To the
extent that other factors (collectively "legislative intent")
matter, the agency may have better access to indicators of this
intent than do judges. This subject, according to Mead, is the
scope of Skidmore" deference.

Using one word for three distinct subjects breeds confusion. Justice Breyer
believes that it has done worse - that it sometimes has led courts to give
more force to an agency's legal arguments (the "persuasion" category) than
to the agency's choices about wise policy (the "respect" category), reversing
the proper role of the political and judicial branches. 2 Furthermore, Mead
thought that there were two boxes rather than three, which may cause
problems down the line.
Most mentions of "deference" or "discretion" in the legal literature about
agencies - and, worse, in opinions - are misleading because they do not
differentiate among these senses of the words. Considerations applicable to
one sense may be off the mark for another. I think that the only real domain
of "discretion" is the domain of delegation - Congress may delegate a lawmaking power to the Executive Branch, whose decisions must be respected

11. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134 (1944).
12. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV.
363 (1986).
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because they are ultimately political. 3 So the Supreme Court said in Mead.
And there is no constitutional problem with delegation. The Supreme Court
hammered that point home in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 14
rejecting the D.C. Circuit's view that delegation broad enough to encompass
real decision-making power violates a "nondelegation doctrine." Not so, the
Court held. Delegation is constitutional; the first Congress itself delegated
like crazy to both the President and the courts (as a part-time legislature must
do);' 5 when there is real delegation, there is real discretion in the holder of the
delegated power. And this kind of discretion must be identical for Article ll
and Article III officers.
Article M itself delegated to the Supreme Court a power to make up a law
of interstate boundary disputes; the Justices have done this with gusto, never
suggesting that there is any problem in implementing judicial views of sound
policy about the right way to draw closure lines across the mouths of
watercourses. The law of admiralty is an invention of federal judges, and like
state tort law it has changed over time as the judges' views of wise policy has
changed. So too with antitrust; 6 what judges have done is little different from
what the FTC does as one political party or another acquires control of that
agency and endows it with a different economic perspective.
The Sherman Act bans contracts in restraint of trade. 17 Yet as Justice
Brandeis observed in ChicagoBoard of Trade, 8 all contracts bind or restrain;
that is what distinguishes contract from wishful thinking. No one supposes
that Congress has made contracts illegal. So judges say, "Now why did
Congress enact such a law?" They answer, "To protect consumers from
monopoly prices." That implies a cast of mind, a menu of approaches, and
even some legal rules, which courts have devised. But the judgment in an
antitrust case does not carry out legislative words. To put this differently,
delegation led judges to read the antitrust laws at a much higher level of
generality than the tax laws. No one dreams of saying that the "goal" of tax
13. See Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., 314 F.3d 875, 882 (7th Cir. 2002) (Easterbrook, J.,

concurring).
14. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
15. For example, the first patent legislation authorized a panel comprising the Attorney
General and the Secretaries of State and War to issue a patent for any "invention or discovery"
(terms left undefined) that they deemed "sufficiently useful and important." Act of Apr. 10,
1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110. How "useful and important" was useful or important enough was
delegated to the panel. See the discussion in DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN
CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 90-93 (1997).

16. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997), which is refreshingly candid about the
common-law nature of the powers judges exercise in antitrust litigation.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
18. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
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is to raise $X of revenue without too much economic dislocation, so that if
because of a recession the Treasury is empty, or because of a boom people
fork over too much, or because the laws cause too much allocative
inefficiency, judges are privileged to change the marginal rates to make it all
come out right. No, tax laws are read particularistically, as rules rather than
standards, as specifying requiredconduct rather than desiredend states. The
big difference is the nature of delegation: zero power has been delegated to
judges in tax cases.
Delegation to thejudiciary (and the discretion that accompanies delegation)
is much less common than delegation to agencies. Why is this? There are two
sorts of reasons, one practical and the other rooted in the Constitution.
On the practical front, it helps to start with the recognition that delegation
to an agency ensures that a single interpretation prevails. There is only one
Secretary of Health and Human Services, but there are thirteen courts of
appeals and about seven hundred odd district judges, some of them very odd
indeed. A question is debatable when it could be decided in different ways by
reasonable people; it is therefore predictable that debatable questions will be
decided different ways by different judges. Worse, once these judges begin
making inconsistent decisions, contradictions enter the stock of precedents;
and with contradictory premises one can "prove" any conclusion. So the size
of the judicial system plus a norm of reasoning from premises found in
judicial opinions provide powerful reasons not to let judges make policy
decisions - and this even without considering the voting paradoxes identified
by Condorcet and his successors. Delegation to an agency permits a
nationally uniform rule without the need for the Supreme Court to settle the
meaning of every law or regulation.19 This also explains why courts almost
always accept an agency's understanding of its own regulations. Unless by
"interpreting" a rule the agency is trying to evade the Administrative
Procedure Act's requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking, 2° accepting
1
2
the agency's view produces uniformity at negligible cost.

A second practical reason is this: delegation expedites change. Sometimes,
as in labor law, it allows political adjustment to the fortunes of labor versus
management, without the need for contentious debate in Congress. Often the
19. See Peter L. Strauss, 150 Cases Per Year: Some Implicationsof the Supreme Court's
Limited Resources for JudicialReview of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1987);
Homemakers N. Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1987).

20. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
21. See Thomas W. Merrill,Textualism and the Futureof the Chevron Doctrine,72 WASH.
U. L.Q. 351, 374 (1994) (observing that agency discretion is justified by a combination of
political accountability, specialized knowledge, flexibility, and national uniformity that judges

cannot duplicate).
HeinOnline -- 57 Okla. L. Rev. 7 2004

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1

adjustment is technical, however, and specialists are apt to make technical
changes better than generalist judges who spend too much of their time
handling cocaine cases.22 As we add to knowledge about how carcinogens
work (and what things are carcinogens), the value of different healthpromoting strategies changes. Unless the EPA had discretion to change its
policy as a result, we would be locked into very bad strategies. This happened
with the Delaney Clause 23 - the law forbidding the FDA to certify any new
food additive that causes any cancer. In the years after its enactment, it
became easier to detect low-level carcinogens, so more new food additives
flunked the test (and it became more expensive to test all candidates). But the
effect was not to promote safety. To the contrary, the Clause's effect was to
keep new food additives off the market even when they were much safer than
the existing products, which were grandfathered. Say what you want about
cyclamates; they are safer than refined sugar! An agency with discretion
might fix this - but that is likely the reason discretion was withheld for so
long. Until recently, when the Delaney Clause was relaxed, 24 established
interest groups were politically successful at protecting their products from
competition.
Adjustment is chancy for agencies in an interest-group world and
impossible forjudges. Congress and the President can control bureaucrats; a
Commissioner of the FDA who certifies too many, too few, or the wrong kind
of food additives can be fired by the President or browbeaten in "oversight
hearings"; the Commissioner's budget can be threatened. It is acceptable to
give the Commissioner a long leash because, if he strays from his master's
wishes, he can be reeled in (or replaced) at low cost. But if a judge strays, the
only remedy is more legislation - which in political terms is much more
costly.
Judges of course realize this, and they do stray - they are more tempted
to stray from the political consensus than bureaucrats or even Presidents. This
is independent of the incoherence problem caused by multiple judges and
conflicting precedents.25 Judges are more tempted to stray because there are
22. This also implies that textualist methods are best for generalist judges even though
specialists would employ nuanced interpretive methods. See Frederick Schauer, Statutory
Construction and the CoordinatingFunction of PlainMeaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231; see
also Frederick Schauer, The Dilemma ofIgnorance:PGA Tour, Inc. v. Casey Martin, 2001 Sup.
CT. REV. 267.
23. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (2000).
24. See, e.g., Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105115, 111 Stat. 2296; Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489.
Together these acts effectively repealed the Delaney Clause.
25. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizingthe Court, 95 HARV. L. REV.
802 (1982).
HeinOnline -- 57 Okla. L. Rev. 8 2004

2004]

DISCRETION IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

9

fewer tools for reigning them in; essentially the only tool is a new statute,
which may be impossible for reasons that I'll get to shortly. It is therefore
predictable that, in a country where legislation is difficult, judges will claim
more political leeway than in a country where legislation is easy. The
difference between the relatively modest English judiciary and the relatively
bold U.S. judiciary illustrates this point.26 The terms of judicial tenure are
identical on the east and west of the Atlantic, but English judges hold less
sway in interpretation. They act under a parliamentary system, which can
alter their decisions quickly, while U.S. judges enjoy more agency slack. This
structural difference may well explain the difference in interpretive theory but this is a positive point rather than a normative one, and the agency slack
in the United States seems to me a cost rather than a benefit because it greatly
complicates the legislative task when the legislature wants to adopt stable and
mechanical rules.
Wait. Have I not just condemned the independent judiciary? To an extent
I have, at least when independence is put to certain ends, and this brings me
to the constitutional point of difference between Article 11 officers and Article
m1I officers. The difference is tenure. When judges make policy - which is,
after all, what discretion in interpretation means - you can't get rid of them.
In a representative democracy, that is a powerful reason not to allow judges
to make policy in the first place. This is especially true in a nation such as
ours whose political system is designed to make it very hard to enact
legislation that changes judicial decisions.
Tenure was created largely to protect individual litigants from political
influence. No one charged with killing a police officer wants to be tried
before a judge who must stand for reelection and fears that, if the defendant
is acquitted, then the police union will wage a campaign against his retention.
No one who operates an abortion clinic wants to face a judiciary whose
election coffers are filled by the hard work of anti-abortion activists. The
most practical way to ensure dispassionate application of law to fact is a
judiciary with very long tenure.
In other words, judges have tenure to make it easier (because less costly)
for them to be faithful to decisions taken in the past. If these decisions are to
be updated, that should be done by those who are supposed to be sensitive to
the contemporary will - administrative officials, Congress, the President.
Although judges are more apt to be dispassionate than are political officials,
their dispassion need not lead them to be more faithful to either old decisions
or the median view of today's legal culture; it may lead them to be more
26. See Eli M. Salzberger, A PositiveAnalysis ofthe Doctrineof Separationof Powers, or:
Why Do We Have an Independent Judiciary?, 13 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 349, 369 (1993).
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faithful to their own views. This is the dark side of tenure.27 Like the Force
in Star Wars, tenure has both a good side and a dark side. Just as with the
Force, the dark side is self-indulgence; if contemporary opinion and politics
do not sway the judge, then the judge's own druthers become more important.
If the Secretary of Transportation gets a swelled head, he can be Dingelized.
(If you don't understand that reference, ask someone who remembers when
the Democrats were a majority in the House of Representatives.) Judges can't
be Dingelized, let alone sacked. And that is why people with tenure should
not be exercising discretion in interpretation.
Public officials must give an account, not simply of meaning, but of why
their view of meaning should be accepted. When meaning is contingent, how
do people with tenure explain why you go to jail if you depart from their
demands? This is a serious question for a nation whose Constitution lacks a
judicial-review clause. Interpretive rules may differ according to the source
of the demand to be obeyed. When the demand depends on recent election,
a flexible contemporary reading may suffice. When the demand depends on
a commission from a dead president, a more textual reading may be necessary
as a constrainton the dead hand, a substitute for the political constraint.
How, then, would one set about a program of granting interpretive
discretion to Article II officers but not Article Ill officers? Largely by
controlling the level of generality. There is that phrase again.
When I say that a law is being interpreted at a low level of generality, I
mean that it is taken as a code of things to do rather than a set of objectives to
achieve. The tax code is a good model. It has many abstract terms, but all
operate on inputs rather than outputs.
A more general statement, by contrast, abstracts away from inputs and
concentrates on consequences. The statement "motorists must not exceed
sixty-five miles an hour" is specific; the statement "motorists must use
reasonable care under the circumstances" is highly general - much more so
than the rule "motorists must drive more slowly than the speed limit during
rain." The more abstract rule may call for detailed inquiries later (what, after
all, is "reasonable care" in the circumstances?) or may not (the rule "do not
discriminate on account of a speaker's viewpoint" eliminates the sort of
balancing after the fact that is common in tort law).
Let me give you an example of how judges can play with levels of
generality in a way that insulates a decision from legislative reaction.
CaliforniaFederalSavings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra28 dealt with a statute, the
27. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, What's So Special About Judges?, 61 U.
COLORADO L. REV. 773 (1990).

28. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
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Pregnancy Discrimination Act, saying that pregnant women must "be treated
the same for all employment-related purposes" as employees who are not
pregnant.29 The question was whether, after the PDA, employers ever may
favor women over men by giving women, but not men, post-birth family
leaves. The law does not say in so many terms. If the law had delegated a
decision to the EEOC, the judiciary would accept almost any answer. But the
PDA did not delegate, so the problem landed in the laps of the Justices.
The PDA was a reaction to General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,3 ° which held
that pregnancy discrimination is not sex discrimination. The PDA overturns
Gilbert. Does it do more - does it give new rights to men who want to stay
home with young children? The Court approached Guerraby changing the
level of generality. Instead of asking "what rules does the phrase 'treated the
same as' imply?," the Justices chose to ask what kind of employment relation
the statute was designed to produce. The majority did this by putting a
hypothetical question to the drafters of the law: "Would you object if women
got a little more than men?" They answered "no" for the silent drafters. The
effect was to boost the level of generality: to look at the law's effects rather
than to formulate rules. One could readily pose a different question implying
much lower generality: "Does 'treated the same as' mean 'treated
identically' ?" Lots of options fall in between.
Is there any way to choose a single right level of generality? Some judges
(or for that matter some legislators) favor formal equality on moral or
prudential grounds; others want to minimize the role of law (or the role of feds
vis-A-vis states); still others think law should do no more than protect victims
of past discrimination while leaving men to fend for themselves; still others
would say that there is no discrimination either way if we view the family unit
rather than individual workers as the object of the law's solicitude. These
imply fundamentally different strategies for looking at rules versus effects.
That's why a judge would allow leeway if the EEOC had to give the answer.
So how should a tenured judge proceed? Recall the Court's hypothetical
question. Who gets this question? The sponsors? The median voters? The
former choice is wrong, but the latter are silent! You will have to reconstruct
the speaker in either case. If you reconstruct a person exactly like yourself
(perhaps on the theory that everyone is reasonable, and you are a model of
reasonableness), then the process of hypothetical querying is worthless. You
might as well ask yourself what is wise and be done with the pretense. If you
imbue the reconstructed speakers with different attributes, however, you get
out only what you put in - and again the process is worthless. There just
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
30. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
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wasn't anything there. There were only the judge's views, made controlling
not by anything in the text, but by the generality shift.
Perhaps coming at this from another angle would help make the point.
Almost every law tackles multiple problems at once. Consider a really simple
law: one that provides only a rule of decision and an enforcement budget.
Suppose 60% of Congress preferred the rule "treat women at least as well
as men" (so the man loses Guerra). Suppose also that half of this 60% wanted
cheap enforcement, and that other Members wanted a larger enforcement
budget but formal equality. The rule "treat women at least as well as men"
could pass independently but not whenjoined with enforcement questions; the
larger budget also could pass independently but not when considered jointly.
To get a larger enforcement budget for the EEOC, Congress must stop with
formal equality (which a majority finds preferable to the status quo
represented by Gilbert). Any interpretation that looks to the sponsors'
preferences as a means to boost the level of generality inevitably misconstrues
the law by imputing to Congress a result that could not have been enacted
given the other issues on the table. If a court later "interprets" the equality
rule as allowing a preference, Congress can't overrule it (60% of the Members
will be opposed on this single-issue vote); but advance knowledge of this
sequence would have ensured weak enforcement. Ex ante, such an approach
would have killed the deal altogether.
Perhaps, instead of asking whether changes in the level of generality will
disturb a statutory package, we should ask whether a two-dimensional deal has
any meaning when the court comes to interpret a single dimension. Suppose
the legislature could agree on (a) preference for women with low funding, or
(b) formal neutrality with high funding. If sponsors refuse to budge from a
preference with high funding, they get no law. And if you put either the
preference or the funding individually, both would pass - but because some
of those who favor a preference want low funding, you can't aggregate these
outcomes. Now if you present the preference issue alone you get a misleading
answer - indeed, even trying to address it alone warps the answer, or
imputes one where there is none!
Isolating the issue also means, as I have stressed, that any judicial decision
can't be undone by the legislature; only a joint decision is feasible politically.
Unlike courts, agencies can and do make multi-dimensional decisions,
creating packages to surmount political impasses. It is no accident that most
rulemakings are complex. Both legislation and regulation depend on
logrolling. Litigation breaks bulk, and this implies a big difference in
appropriate interpretive strategy.
All in all, for judges compelled to consider issues in isolation, there just
isn't anything there except for the text. And this problem can't be solved by
HeinOnline -- 57 Okla. L. Rev. 12 2004
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Akhil Amar's intratextualism, of which I am otherwise a fan.31 It was not
possible in Guerrato compare how words were used across clauses - in part
because the clause at hand used a different vocabulary from the budget
provisions and those related to the statute of limitations, and in part because
the political coalition was complex, so we can't expect either substantive or
linguistic consistency across clauses. A statute such as the PDA not only
lacks a linguistic concordance but also lacks an underlying spirit - not
because the intent of the principal sponsors is hard to discover, but because a
collective body doesn't have a brain. The body differs from the sponsors, and
the body as a whole just votes. Compromises lack purposes. And that has
powerful effects on interpretation. It means that boosting the level of
generality - switching from rules to results - assumes away the only things
Congress actually did. The result can't be called interpretation at all, and if
there was no delegation to the judiciary then the result can't be called
legitimate.
I drifted away into theory. Back to the concrete. Let me describe three
cases that by my lights illustrate both sound application of textualism in court
and how an agency might legitimately decide otherwise.
My first illustration comes from labor law. In Guidry v. Sheet Metal
Workers Pension Fund,32 Curtis Guidry pleaded guilty to embezzling funds
from a pension plan of which he was a trustee. Guidry was himself entitled
to a pension from the plan, and the remaining trustees confiscated the value
of his pension in partial fulfilment of Guidry's obligation to repay what he
stole. Guidry filed suit, contending that this offset violated the anti-alienation
clause of ERISA. He lost in the Tenth Circuit, which asked: what is the antialienation clause for? To protect pensioners from their own improvident
spending, not to enable them to retain ill-got gains - which they could do if
they were allowed to live high off the booty while putting their lawful income
in trust and stifling the victims. 33 If the enacting Congress had been asked,
"Would you make an exception to the anti-alienation clause for persons who
steal from the pension fund?" it likely would have answered yes. So Guidry
lost.
34
No surprise. Those of you who fancy the outcome of Riggs v. Palmer
31. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999).
32. 493 U.S. 365 (1990).
33. See generally Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 856 F.2d 1457,
1459-60 (10th. Cir. 1988).
34. 22 N.E. 188 (1889). This case is notable in part for the weight that scholars opposed
to literalism place on it. E.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 15-20 (1986); WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION
OF PUBLIC POLICY 565-67 (3d ed. 2002); RICHARD A. POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE
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could scarcely imagine a different outcome. Riggs held that, despite a statute
calling for strict enforcement of wills, an heir who murdered the testator could
not collect his bequest.
Yet the Court reversed in Guidry, and unanimously. It pretty much began
and ended with the language of the statute. The anti-alienation clause contains
no exceptions. Whatever Congress might have done, it had not done. To the
extent that the Court referred to purposes at all, it conceived them concretely
rather than abstractly. What is the purpose of an anti-alienation clause? It is
to prevent appeals to the equities case by case. In other words, the Justices did
not ask, "What is the value served by this particular rule?" Instead they asked,
"What is the value served by rules, in general?" This led the Court to enforce
the rule and to rebuff efforts at generalization and reconstruction. Guidry
represents today's norm in the judiciary, but for an agency a different outcome
could be sustained easily. If the Department of Labor held delegated power,
it could say that Congress enacted ERISA against the background of Riggs and
similar cases, justifying a shift in the level of generality when embodied in
prospective rulemaking.
My second example is an ethics case. In Crandon v. United States, 35 five
of Boeing's employees decided to go to work for the federal government.
Although Boeing does not usually give departing employees severance
payments, it awarded these five packages calculated to make up the difference
between their federal salaries and their Boeing salaries for the anticipated
period of their federal service. The government sued, arguing that these
payments violated a law forbidding any person from "supplement[ing]"
federal salaries. The Department of Justice relied on an impressive chain of
cases, and an even more impressive series of opinions issued by the Office of
Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice, taking a purposive view of the
law.
Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist and Assistant Attorney General
Scalia had signed some of these opinions when they headed the Office of
Legal Counsel. The opinions went like this: Why have such laws? Why, to
prevent federal employees from being unduly grateful to private benefactors.
Supplementation smells like bribery even if it does not entail a quid pro quo.
Ethics laws prevent the appearance of impropriety. Such an appearance arose
here, and the employees doubtless felt grateful to Boeing and so might favor
it. Following the Rehnquist-Scalia interpretive line, the court of appeals held
the payments illegal.

106-07 (1990).
35. 494 U.S. 152 (1990).
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Not the Supreme Court, which reversed unanimously in an opinion
revealing that Antonin Scalia has a very different view of judicial and
administrative authority.36 His concurring opinion observed that there are
many ways to write ethics laws, and that a law in the present tense dealing
with receiving supplements to salary differs in form from a law dealing with
the appearance of impropriety or acts prior to entering government service.
To honor the legislative choice, the Court must enforce the device that was
chosen. Otherwise, in writing what the judges believe is a better law to
achieve Congress' ends, the court may actually be changing the nature of
those objectives. In the process, the court would also deprive the addressees
of the law of fair warning. So the government lost. This case is particularly
instructive not only because it is unanimous but also because it comes against
such an extensive background of purposive, high-generality construction of
similar ethics laws. This was a case where an agency had done it differently.
But when there was no delegation, and the Court had to interpret directly, the
Court chose low generality and the implementation of form over function.
My third case is Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,37 which considered
whether the Federal Arbitration Act applies to a contract between a retailer
and its employees. Circuit City and Adams agreed to arbitrate all
employment-related disputes, including those under federal statutes. When
such a dispute arose, however, Adams headed to court, contending that the
arbitration agreement was invalid under California law. This supposed, of
course, that California law governed, and Circuit City replied that the
agreement was enforceable as a matter of the Federal Arbitration Act, which
had already been construed to reach all contracts within the limits of the
federal commerce power. As the employee's claim arose under federal antidiscrimination law, there could be no doubt about federal power. But Adams
argued that section 1 of the Act excluded his situation. This section provides,
in part, that "nothing herein.., shall apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign
or interstate commerce. 38
There are at least two ways to read this language - which means that if
implementation had been committed to the EEOC, the agency could choose
freely. One way to read the text emphasizes "any... workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce." We know that includes Adams, for the
Commerce Clause was the hook for his federal claim. On this view, section
1 means that the FAA does not cover labor relations, which are left to the
36. Id. at 168-84 (Scalia, J., concurring).

37. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
38. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
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National Labor Relations Act and, for unorganized workers, state law. The
other way to read it starts at a lower level of generality by emphasizing the
list: "seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers." This sounds
like an exclusion of the transportation industries, extensively covered by other
federal laws and agencies. On this reading, section 1 of the Federal
Arbitration Act partitions the world between administrative and judicial
domains.
Is there some way of deciding which reading is right without boosting
generality and asking (as an agency would do) what is a good outcome, or who
is in the political driver's seat? Both sides' arguments are anachronistic, for
the administrative apparatus for transportation claims was not completed for
another seven years after the Arbitration Act (enacted in 1925) - and the
structure of federal labor law, on which the broad reading of the exclusion
depends, was not put in place for another thirteen years. The majority tried
some intratextual tools, contrasting section 1 (which says "engaged in
commerce") with section 2 (which says that the Act covers contracts
"affecting" commerce) - and the difference implies that section 1 did not
carve out all contracts with workers. This was a decent, but not conclusive,
move. What particularly impressed me, and should interest you, however, was
the debate about the right level of generality.
Adams relied heavily on legislative history - not committee reports and
other efforts at explanation,but the background of the law: Who lobbied for
it? Who lobbied against it? What did they tell Congress this law would do?
In many ways this type of legislative history is superior to legislators' words,
which can be cooked; it is a more objective deployment of the linguistic and
political context of legislation, where it is the context that conveys the
information. Here is how the Court replied:
We ought not attribute to Congress an official purpose based on the
motives of a particular group that lobbied for or against a certain
proposal - even assuming the precise intent of the group can be
determined, a point doubtful both as a general rule and in the
instant case. It is for the Congress, not the courts, to consult
political forces and then decide how best to resolve conflicts in the
course of writing the objective embodiments of law we know as
statutes.39
This is a clean statement of the difference between courts and agencies in
interpretive discretion. But it would have been even better had the Court said,
instead of, "we don't attribute purpose X based on input Y," something like,
39. Adams, 532 U.S. at 120.
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"we don't care about the purpose, because 'purpose' is all about outcomes
while we are trying to determine the rules of the game." The passage follows
the common strategy of professing to care about the "intent of Congress" and
then making that intent objective, converting it back to meaning along the
lines of Holmes, who observed:
[A statute] does not disclose one meaning conclusively according
to the laws of language. Thereupon we ask, not what this man
meant, but what those words would mean in the mouth of a normal
speaker of English, using them in the circumstances in which they
But the normal speaker of English is merely a
were used ....
a
special variety, literary form, so to speak, of our old friend the
prudent man. He is external to the particular writer, and a
reference to him as the criterion is simply another instance of the
externality of the law.
We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what
the statute means.4 °
As you may know, this case had four dissenters. But the dissenting view
becomes enfeebled once it goes beyond the textual reading that emphasizes
the "in commerce" language. Both Justices Stevens and Souter wrote dissents
loaded with references to "inequality of bargaining power," a political slogan
having no ascertainable economic content. To load up an opinion with such
things is to sound like an agency - which, oddly, the dissenters professed not
to do. The concluding passage in Justice Stevens's opinion reads:
This case illustrates the wisdom of an observation made by Justice
Aharon Barak of the Supreme Court of Israel. He has perceptively
noted that the "minimalist" judge "who holds that the purpose of
the statute may be learned only from its language" has more
discretion than the judge "who will seek guidance from every
reliable source." Judicial Discretion 62 (Y. Kaufmann transl.
1989). A method of statutory interpretation that is deliberately
uninformed, and hence unconstrained, may produce a result that is
consistent with a court's own views of how things should be, but
it may also defeat the very purpose for which a provision was
4
enacted. That is the sad result in this case. '
40. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation,12 HARV. L. REV. 417,
417-19 (1899), reprintedin OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 204, 207
(1921).
41. Adams, 532 U.S. at 133 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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To seek guidance on value-free adjudication in the views of a judge who
describes himself as a "radical activist"42 is risible. Can it be that Justice
Stevens did not know the judicial record of the person whose words he was
quoting? Has Justice Stevens forgotten Harold Leventhal's jibe that using
legislative history is like looking over the crowd at a cocktail party and
picking out your friends? Judge Leventhal's remark encapsulates much of
what I have been saying. The crowd contains the many dimensions of politics;
to have access to all dimensions when the judicial task is limited to one issue
is to preclude any possibility of coherent, principled decision.
In closing I want to emphasize that mine is not a hermeneutical theory of
interpretation. "Plain meaning" as a way to understand language is silly. In
interesting cases, meaning is not "plain"; it must be imputed, and the choice
among meanings must have a footing more solid than a dictionary - which
is a museum of words, a historical catalog, rather than a means to decode the
work of legislatures.4 3
Any theory of meaning must be jurisprudential. What does the Constitution
require legislatures to do to produce a law? What is the proper relation
between tenured judges and the evolving political branches of the
government? To the extent the constitutional 'ules permit this inquiry, what
are the relative costs of error from expansive versus beady-eyed readings?
These are the right questions, and I have endeavored to show that the answers
lie in a relatively unimaginative, mechanical process of interpretation in court,
coupled with a richer, more contextual method out of court.
One theme you hear in the press, the halls of Congress, and the legal
academy is that the move to textualism is political, a conservative reaction to
42. Justice Barak's self-description as a "radical activist" is quoted in STEPHEN BURBANK,
261 (2002).
See also Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a
Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16 (2002).
43. Country Mut. Ins. v. Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n, 876 F.2d 599, 600 (7th Cir. 1989); see
also Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: DictionaryShopping in the Supreme Court,30 ARiZ.
ST. L.J. 275 (1998); A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries,Plain Meaning, and Context in
StatutoryInterpretation,17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71 (1994); Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey
L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon HasBecome a Fortress:The United States Supreme Court's Use
of Dictionaries,47 BUFF. L. REV. 227 (1999); Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The
Lexicon Remains a Fortress:An Update, 5 GREEN BAG 51 (2001). Finding definitions outside
of dictionaries is even more risky, a point that the Justices missed when turning to newspapers
and biblical quotations in a vain effort to cabin the meaning of the word "possess." See
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 129 (1998). The Justices missed the point that the
context of a word depends on the linguistic community of addressees and not the full range of
how a word ever has been used. Dictionaries are not better just because their etymology
sections now can be researched online!
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH
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laws enacted by Congresses to the left of those appointing the judges. Yet
many of Franklin Roosevelt's justices relied on plain language. (Have we
forgotten Justice Black so soon?) Other nations treat simplicity of
interpretation as a guarantee of faithfulness to the legislature. England is one,
France another. After the Revolution, France's new democratic government
imposed a highly formal style on the predominantly aristocratic bench." It
believed that a formal, plain-meaning approach would prevent the bench from
straying too far.
If the textualist interprets laws written in a more conservative era, the
results appear "conservative" to modem eyes. Sometimes, however, the
difference runs the other way. When the text is to the left of the judge,
textualism produces results that are politically "liberal." To see this, consider
a highly publicized case of a decade ago.
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which in Guerrawas treated to a boost
in the level of generality, returned to the Supreme Court in UAW v. Johnson
Controls,Inc. 45 Johnson Controls makes batteries, which use lead. Lead can
cross the placenta during pregnancy and injure the fetus, although the degree
of risk is open to question. There is also some risk from the father's side,
although again "how much" is a big medical question. Johnson Controls
responded to these risks by banning all fertile women from its industrial work
force to minimize the risk to the next generation.
A majority of my court followed the approach of Guerra and boosted the
level of generality.46 They first asked why there is a Title VII, and why a
PDA. They answered, to prevent invidious discrimination against women.
Johnson Controls, though, expressed concern for children of both sexes and
had no animus against women. Thus, they concluded, its policy was not sex
discrimination.
Two can play at the generality game! In Johnson Controls, it allowed
judges to indulge their preferences about wise policy - for the appellate
majority in Johnson Controlsvery much approved of the employer's decision.
Low generality, lashing adjudication to text, worked in the politically liberal
fashion: the text says that an employer may distinguish between the sexes only
to the extent that men and women differ in their ability to do the job. Effects
on the next generation do not matter to a worker's current productivity. So
there may be no distinction, whether or not one would be wise in a long-run
perspective. That is indeed what the Supreme Court said, with the blessing of

44. See Frederick Schauer, The Practiceand Problemsof Plain Meaning: A Response to
Aleinikoffand Shaw, 45 VAND. L. REv. 715,733 (1992) (crediting Tony Honor6 with the point).
45. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
46. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
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Justice Scalia, that champion of textualism. 47 Equal means same. So there.
The women prevailed.
Now consider again: is choosing the method of interpretation inherently
political? That most of the decisions I have discussed are unanimous - or
lopsided with no apparent political spin to the voting - suggests not. It can
be political if the interpreter is intellectually dishonest, switching between
"plain meaning" and more expansive styles according to the judge's estimate
of the preferable outcome. It can be political if the interpreter uses the
rhetoric of low generality to disguise other methods. But of course the search
for "intent" in the large, accompanied by boosting the level of generality, is
more indulgent of the judge's druthers than the methods I have discussed.
When we worry about tenured officers exalting their will over that of the
legislature - that is, all the time - we ought to prefer a model of
construction under which this is a sin rather than one under which it is the
norm.

47. Justice Thomas, who is a more rigorous textualist than Justice Scalia, was not on the
Court at the time and thus lacked an equivalent opportunity.
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